This is chapter 3 of the [1]"The Phenomenon of Science" by [2]Valentin F.
   Turchin
     ____________________________________________________________________________

   Contents:
     * [3]THE METASYSTEM TRANSITION
     * [4]CONTROL OF THE REFLEX
     * [5]THE REFLEX AS A FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT
     * [6]WHY ASSOCIATIONS OF REPRESENTATIONS ARE NEEDED
     * [7]EVOCATION BY COMPLEMENT
     * [8]SPOTS AND LINES
     * [9]THE CONDITIONED REFLEX AND LEARNING
     * [10]MODELING
     * [11]COGNITION OF THE WORLD
     ____________________________________________________________________________

                                      CHAPTER THREE.
                            ON THE PATH TOWARD THE HUMAN BEING

THE METASYSTEM TRANSITION

   SUBSEQUENT STAGES in the development of the nervous system will be described as
   stated above, on a more phenomenological level. For this we must summarize the
   results of our investigation of the mechanism of evolution in the early stages,
   using the terminology of general cybernetic concepts. Having begun to think in
   this direction, we shall easily detect one general characteristic of transitions
   from lower to higher stages: In each stage the biological system has a subsystem
   which may be called the highest controlling device; this is the subsystem which
   originated most recently and has the highest level of organisation. The
   transition to the next stage occurs by multiplication of such systems (multiple
   replication) and integration of them--by joining them into a single whole with
   the formation (by the trial and error method) of a control system headed by a new
   subsystem, which now becomes the highest controlling device in the new stage of
   evolution. We shall call the system made up of control subsystem X and the many
   homogeneous subsystems A[1], A[2], A[3] . . . controlled by it a metasystem in
   relation to systems A[1], A[2], A[3] . . . Therefore we shall call the transition
   from one stage to the next the metasystem transition. [IMG.FIG3.1.GIF] Figure
   3.1. The metasystem transition

   This concept will play a crucial part in our subsequent presentation. The
   metasystem transition creates a higher level of organization, the metalevel in
   relation to the level of organization of the subsystems being integrated.

   From the functional point of view the metasystem transition is the case where the
   activity a, which is characteristic of the top control system at a lower stage,
   becomes controlled at the higher stage and there appears a qualitatively new,
   higher, type of activity b which controls the activity a. Replication and
   selection bring about the creation of the necessary structures.

   The first metasystem transition we discern in the history of animals is the
   appearance of movement. The integrated subsystems are the parts of the cell that
   ensure metabolism and reproduction. The position of these parts in space is
   random and uncontrolled until, at a certain time, there appear organs that
   connect separate parts of the cell and put them into motion: cell membranes,
   cilia, flagella. A metasystem transition occurs which may be defined by the
   formula: control of position = movement.

   In this stage movement is uncontrolled and not correlated in any way with the
   state of the environment. Nature's next task is to control it. To control motion
   means to make it a definite function of the state of the environment. This leads
   to irritability. Irritability occurs when--under the influence of external
   factors--there is a change in the state of some segments of the cell, and when
   this change spreads to other sectors--specifically those which ensure movement.
   Thus, the formula for the metasystem transition from the second stage to the
   third is: control of movement = irritability.

   Chemical Era  1. Chemical foundations of life
                 2 Movement
                 3 Irritability (simple reflex)
   Cybernetic Era
                 4 Nerve net (complex reflex)
                 5 Associating (conditioned reflex)

   Figure 3.2. Stages in the evolution of life before the era of reason.

   The integration of cells with formation of the multicellular organism is also a
   transition from a system to a metasystem. But this transition concerns the
   structural aspect exclusively and is not describable in functional terms. From a
   functional point of view it is ultimately unimportant whether reproduction and
   integration of a certain part of the organism occur or whether organisms are
   integrated as whole units. This is a technical question, so to speak.
   Irritability is already manifested in unicellular organisms, but it reveals its
   capabilities fully after cell integration.

   An important characteristic of the metasystem transition must be pointed out
   here. When the subsystems being integrated are joined into a metasystem,
   specialization occurs; the subsystems become adapted to a particular activity and
   lose their capability for other types of activity. Specialization is seen
   particularly clearly where whole organisms are integrated. Each subsystem being
   integrated in this case contains a great deal which is ''superfluous''--functions
   necessary for independent life but useless in the community, where other
   subsystems perform these functions. Thus, specialized muscle and nerve cells
   appear in the multicellular organism.

   In general we must note that the integration of subsystems is by no means the end
   of their evolutionary development. We must not imagine that systems A[1], A[2],
   A[3], . . . are reproduced in large numbers after which the control device X
   suddenly arises ''above them". On the contrary, the rudiments of the control
   system form when the number of subsystems A[i] is still quite small. As we saw
   above, this is the only way the trial and error method can operate. But after
   control subsystem X has formed, there is a massive replication of subsystems A[i]
   and during this process both A[i] and X are refined. The appearance of the
   structure for control of subsystems A[i] does not conclude rapid growth in the
   number of subsystems A[i]; rather, it precedes and causes this growth because it
   makes multiplication of A[i] useful to the organism. The carrier of a definite
   level of organization branches out only after the new, higher level begins to
   form. This characteristic can be called the law of branching growth of the
   penultimate level. In the phenomenological functional description, therefore, the
   metasystem transition does not appear immediately after the establishment of a
   new level; it appears somewhat later, after the penultimate level has branched
   out. The metasystem transition always involves two levels of organization.

   Let us continue our survey of the stages of evolution. We shall apply the
   principle of the metasystem transition to the level of irritability. At this
   level, stimulation of certain sectors of a unicellular organism or a specialized
   nerve cell in a multicellular organism occurs directly from the external
   environment, and this stimulation causes direct (one-to-one) stimulation of
   muscular activity. What can control of irritability signify? Apparently, creation
   of a nerve net whose elements, specifically the effectors, are not stimulated by
   the environment directly but rather through the mediation of a complex control
   system. This is the stage of evolution we related to the concept of the complex
   reflex. The control of irritability in this stage is seen especially clearly in
   the fact that where there is a goal, stimulation of the effectors depends not
   only on the state of the environment but also upon this goal--that is, on the
   state of certain internal neurons of the net. Thus, the formula for this
   metasystem transition (from the third stage to the fourth) is: control of
   irritability = complex reflex.

   What next'?

CONTROL OF THE REFLEX

   NO MATTER how highly refined the nerve net built on the principle of the complex
   reflex may be, it has one fundamental shortcoming: the invariability of its
   functioning over time. The animal with such a nervous system cannot extract
   anything from its experience; its reactions will always be the same and its
   actions will always be executed according to the same plan. If the animal is to
   be able to learn, its nervous system must contain some variable components which
   ensure change in the relations among situations and actions. These components
   will therefore carry out control of reflexes. It is commonly known that animals
   have the ability to learn and develop new reflexes. In the terminology introduced
   by I. P. Pavlov, the inborn reflex included in the nervous system by nature is
   called an unconditioned reflex while a reflex developed under the influence of
   the environment is called a conditioned reflex. When we speak of a complex reflex
   we have in mind, of course, an unconditioned complex reflex. The presence of
   components that control complex reflexes manifests itself, in experiments with
   teaching animals, as the ability to form conditioned reflexes.

   We cannot, however, equate the concept of the conditioned reflex with the concept
   of control of a reflex. The latter concept is broader. After all, our concept of
   the complex reflex, taken in the context of the description of general principles
   of the evolution of the nervous system, essentially signifies any fixed
   connection between the states of classifiers, representation fixers, and
   effectors. Therefore, control of reflexes must be understood as the creation,
   growing out of individual experience, of any variable connections among these
   objects. Such connections are called associations of representations or simply
   associations. The term ''representation" here is understood in the broad sense as
   the state of any subsystems of the brain, in particular the classifiers and
   effectors. We shall call the formation of associations associating (this
   terminology is somewhat awkward, but it is precise). Thus, the fifth stage of
   evolution is the stage of associations. The formula for the metasystem transition
   to this stage is: control of reflexes = associating.

THE REFLEX AS A FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT

   THE CONCEPTS of the reflex and the association are functional not structural
   concepts. The connection between stimulus S and response R in the reflex (see
   figure 3.3) does not represent the transmission of information from one subsystem
   to another, it is a transition from one generalized state to another. This
   distinction is essential to avoid confusing the reflex, as a definite functional
   diagram which describes behavior, with the embodiment of this diagram, that is,
   with the cybernetic device that reveals this diagram of behavior.

   [IMG.FIG3.3.GIF]

   Figure 3.3. Functional diagram of the unconditioned reflex

   Confusion can easily arise, because the simplest embodiment of reflex behavior
   has a structural diagram that coincides externally with the diagram shown in
   figure 3.3, except that S and R in it must be understood as physical subsystems
   that fix the stimulus and response. This coincidence is not entirely accidental.
   As we have already said in defining the functional diagram, breaking the set of
   all states of the system down into subsets which are ascribed to vertices of the
   graph is closely tied to breaking the system down into subsystems. Specifically,
   each subsystem that can be in two states (yes/no) can be related to the set of
   all states of the system as a whole for which this system is in a definite state,
   for example ''yes.'' More simply, when defining the generalised state we consider
   only the state of the given subsystem, paying no attention to what is happening
   with the other subsystems. Let us assume that the letters S and R signify
   precisely these subsystems, that is to say, subsystem S is the discriminator for
   stimulus (set of situations) S and subsystem R is the effector that evokes
   response R. Then the statement that ''yes'' in subsystem S is transmitted along a
   communications channel (arrow) to subsystem R, putting it also in the ''yes''
   state, coincides with the statement that the ,generalised state S switches
   (arrow) to state R. Thus the structural and functional diagrams are very similar.
   It is true that the structural diagram in no way reflects the fact that ''yes''
   evokes a ''yes" not a "no,'' whereas this is the very essence of the reflex. As
   we have already said, the reflex is a functional concept.

WHY ASSOCIATIONS OF REPRESENTATIONS ARE NEEDED

   THESE PRELIMINARY considerations were required in order for us to be able to
   better grasp the concept of association and the connection between a functional
   description using associations and a structural description by means of
   classifiers. Because each classifier can be connected to one or several
   generalized states, there is a hierarchy of generalized states corresponding to
   the hierarchy of classifiers. When introducing the concept of the classifier we
   pointed out that for each state of the classifier (we can now say for each
   generalized state of the system as a whole) there is a corresponding, definite
   concept at the input of the system--that is, the input situation is affiliated
   with a definite set. The concepts of the Aristotelian ''concept'' and the
   ''generalized state'' are close to one another; both are sets of states. But the
   "generalised state'' is a more general concept and may take account of the state
   not just of receptors but also of any other subsystems, in particular
   classifiers. This is essential to follow the dynamics of the state of the system
   during the process of information processing.

   Let us see how the generalized states of the K level of the hierarchy and the
   next level, K + 1, are interconnected. As we know, the chief task of the
   classifiers is to store ''significant'' information and discard ''insignificant''
   information. This means that there is some set of states on level K which in the
   functional diagram has an arrow going from each of the states to the same state
   at level K + 1. In figure 3.4 below, the representations (generalized states)
   T[1]andT[2] evoke representation U equally.

   [IMG.FIG3.4.GIF]

   Figure 3.4. Association of representations

   If T[1]and T[2] always accompany one another this diagram will unquestionably be
   advantageous to the animal. He does not have to know that T[1] and T[2] are
   occurring; it is enough if he knows that U is occurring. In this way superfluous
   information is discarded and useful information is compressed. The compression of
   information is possible because T[1] andT[2] are always encountered together.
   This is a fact which is external to the nervous system and refers only to the
   stream of situations being fed to it. It testifies to the existence of a definite
   organization in the stream of situations, which is a consequence of the organized
   nature of the environment surrounding the animal. The organization of the nervous
   system and its activity (the system of reflexes) reflect characteristics of the
   environment. This happens because, by testing different ways to discard
   information, nature finally finds the variation where the information discarded
   is indeed superfluous and unnecessary owing to the partially organized nature of
   the environment.

   In the stage of the unconditioned reflex the structure of such connections, as
   shown in figure 3.4, does not change during the life of the animal and is the
   same for all animals of the given species. As we have already said, however, such
   a situation is not satisfactory. The metasystem transition occurs, and the
   connections between generalized states become controlled. Now if T[1] andT[2] in
   the individual experience of the animal always (or at least quite often)
   accompany one another, new connections form in the animal brain which are not
   determined uniquely by heredity. This is associating--the formation of a new
   association of representations. It is clear that associations form among
   representations of the highest level of the hierarchy. Thus, the most general
   correlations in the environment, those which are the same for all times and all
   places of habitation, are reflected in the permanent organization of the
   lowerlevels of classifiers. The more particular correlations are reflected by
   variable connections at the highest level.

EVOCATION BY COMPLEMENT

   THE DIAGRAM shown in figure 3.4 may cause misunderstanding. When speaking of an
   association of representations we usually mean something like a two-way
   connection between T[1] andT[2], where T[1] evokes T[2] and T[2]evokes T[1]. But
   in our diagram both representations evoke something different, specifically U,
   and there are no feedback arrows from U to T[1 ]and T[2].

   In fact, the diagram shown in figure 3.4 more closely corresponds to the concept
   of the association of representations than a diagram with feedback does.
   Specifically, it contains an evocation, in a certain sense, of representation
   T[2]by representation T[1 ](and vice versa), but this is evocation by complement.
   The representation U contains both T[2] and T[1]; after all, it was conceived by
   our nervous system as equivalent to the simultaneous presence of T[2] and T[1].
   Therefore, when T[1 ]evokes U in the absence of T[2], then T[2] is contained
   concealed in U itself. By evoking U we, so to speak, complement T[1] with the
   nonexistent T[2].

   This process of mental complementing is in no way related to the fact that the
   association is developed by learning. Only the method by which the brain
   processes information plays a part here. When inborn lower-level mechanisms
   operate the effect of the complementing shows itself even more clearly; no kind
   of learning or training will weaken or strengthen it.

   [IMG.FIG3.5.GIF]

   Look at figure 3.5. In it you see not just points but also a line, an arc. In
   fact there is no line at all. But you mentally supplement (complement) the
   drawing with points so that a solid line is formed. In terms of figure 3.4. T[1]
   here is the actually existing points, U is the line, and T[2] is the
   complementary points. The fact that you discern a nonexistent line testifies to
   the presence in the brain (or in the retina) of classifiers which create the
   representation of U.

   Why did these classifiers arise? Because the situations arriving at the input of
   our visual apparatus possess the characteristic of continuity. The illuminations
   of neighboring receptors of the retina are strongly correlated. The image on the
   retina is not a mosaic set of points, it is a set of light spots. Therefore,
   translating the image into the language of spots, the brain (we say ''brain''
   arbitrarily, not going into the question of where the translation is in fact
   made) rejects useless information and stores useful information. Because
   ''consisting of spots'' is a universal characteristic of images on the retina,
   the language of spots must be located at one of the lowest levels and it must be
   inborn. The line which we "see" in figure 3.5 is a long, narrow spot.

SPOTS AND LINES

   NOTICE, we have reduced the concept of the line to the concept of the spot. We
   had to do this because we were establishing the theoretical basis for the
   existence of the corresponding classifiers. In reality, it is possible to
   conclude from the two-dimensional continuity of the image on the retina that the
   basic concept for the brain should be the concept of the spot. not the line. The
   line can be included as either an exotically shaped spot or as the boundary
   between spots. This theoretical consideration is confirmed by numerous
   observations.

   [IMG.FIG3.6.GIF]

   Figure 3.6. Concealed circle formed by the vertices of angles

   A circle formed by the vertices of angles is clearly seen in figure 3.6 a. In
   figure 3.6 b the vertices of the angles are located at exactly the same points,
   but their sides are directed every which way, some outside and some inside. As a
   result the circle disappears. It is possible to follow the vertices along,
   switching attention from one to another, and ascertain that they are set in a
   circle, but you cannot see this as you can in the first drawing, even though the
   points which make up the circle are all vertices of angles and all lie on the
   circumference of the circle. The simplest machine program for recognizing circles
   would "see'' the circle in figure 3.6 b (as well as figure 3.6 a). But our eye
   does not see it. In figure 3.6 a, where all the rays are directed out, however,
   our eye glosses them into something like a rim and clearly sees the internal
   circle, a two-dimensional formation, a spot. The circumference, the boundary of
   this spot, also becomes visible.

   There are many visual illusions resulting from the fact that we ''see in spots.''
   They offer instructive examples of inborn associations. One of the best ones is
   shown in figure 3.7.

   [IMG.FIG3.7.GIF]

   Figure 3.7a is a square, and its diagonals intersect at right angles. Figure 3.7
   b is constructed of arcs, but its vertices form precisely the same square as in
   figure 3.7 a. and therefore the diagonals also intersect at right angles. This is
   almost impossible to believe, so great is the illusion that the diagonals of
   figure 3.7 b are approximated to the vertical. This illusion may be explained by
   the fact that alongside the microcharacteristics of the figure--that is, the
   details of its shape--we always perceive its macrocharacteristics, its overall
   appearance. The overall appearance of figure 3.7 b is that of a spot which is
   elongated on the vertical. The degree of elongation may be judged by figure 3.7
   c. This figure is a rectangle whose area is equal to the area of figures 3.7 a
   and b, while the ratio of its width to its height is equal to the ratio of the
   average width of figure 3.7 b to its average height. The hypothetical classifier
   which records the overall elongation of the figure will arrive at the same state
   in contemplating figure 3.7 b as in contemplating figure 3.7 c. In other words,
   whether we desire it or not, figure 3.7 b is associated in our mind with the
   rectangle in figure 3.7 c. Following the diagonals in figure 3.7 b in our mind,
   we equate them with the diagonals of figure 3.7 c, which form acute vertical
   angles. The classifier that records elongation of the spot is unquestionably a
   useful thing it was especially useful for our distant ancestors who did not
   perceive the world in more subtle concepts. But because we cannot switch it on or
   off at will, it sometimes does us a disservice, causing visual deception.

THE CONDITIONED REFLEX AND LEARNING

   BUT LET US RETURN from inborn associations to developed ones, that is, to the
   actual associating of representations. The very essence of the metasystem
   transition from the fourth stage of evolution to the fifth lies in the difference
   between the suffixes of two words from the same root. The association is simply
   one of the aspects of the complex reflex, while associating is control of
   associations: the formation of new associations and disappearance of old ones.

   The capability for associating representations appears most fully as the
   capability for forming (and therefore also recognizing) new concepts. The dog
   that recognizes its master from a distance may serve as an example.

   The Pavlovian conditioned reflex is a more particular manifestation of the
   capability for associating. The diagram of this reflex is shown in figure 3.8.

   [IMG.FIG3.8.GIF]

   Figure 3.8. Diagram of the conditioned reflex.

   The unconditioned stimulus S[1] (food) is always accompanied by the conditioned
   stimulus S[2] (a whistle), and as a result they become associated in one
   representation U, which, because of the presence of S[1] in it, causes the
   response R (salivation). Then stimulus S[2] causes U, and therefore R, even where
   S[1] is not present. The whistle causes salivation.

   A question may arise here. The conditioned reflex arises on the basis of the
   unconditioned reflex whose diagram is S -> R. At the same time, if the
   conditioned stimulus is removed in figure 3.8, we shall obtain the diagram S[1]->
   U -> R. How do we know that step U exists? Is this an arbitrary hypothesis?

   In reality the diagram shown in figure 3.8 contains absolutely no hypotheses. We
   shall emphasize once more that this diagram is functional, not structural. We are
   making no assumptions about the organization of the nerve net; we are simply
   describing observed facts, which are these: first, state S[1] leads, through the
   mediation of some intermediate states, to state R; second, state S[2] in the end
   also leads to R. Therefore, at some moment these two processes are combined. We
   designate the state at this moment U and obtain the diagram we are discussing. In
   this way our diagram, and our approach in general, differ from the Pavlovian
   diagram of the reflex arc, which is precisely the structural diagram, a
   physiological model of higher nervous activity.

   The process of learning, if it is not reduced to the development of certain
   conditioned reflexes (that is, touching only the discriminatory hierarchy) also
   includes the element of acquiring know-how, development of specific skills. The
   process of learning also fits within the diagram of associating representations
   in the general meaning we give to this concept. After all, learning involves the
   development and reinforcement of a detailed plan to achieve a goal. a new plan
   that did not exist before. The plan may be represented as an organized group of
   associations. Let us recall the regulation diagram (see [12]figure 2.6). With a
   fixed goal the comparison block must juxtapose a definite action to each
   situation. The ''untaught'' comparison block will test all possible actions and
   stop at those which yield a reduction in the discrepancy between the situation
   and the goal (the trial and error method). As a result of learning a connection
   is established between the situation and the appropriate action (which is, after
   all, a representation also) so that the ''taught'' comparison block executes the
   necessary action quickly and without error.

   Now for a few words about instinct and the relationship between instinctive
   behavior and behavior developed through learning. Obviously, instinct is
   something passed on by inheritance--but exactly what? In the book already
   referred to, Miller, Galantier, and Pribram define instinct as a ''hereditary,
   invariable, involuntary plan.'' Plans, as we know, are organized on the
   hierarchical principle. It is theoretically possible to assume the existence of
   an instinct that applies to all stages of the hierarchy, including both the
   general strategy and particular tactical procedures all the way to contracting
   individual muscles. ''But if such an instinct does exist,'' these authors write,
   ''we have never heard of it.'' The instinct always keeps a definite level in the
   hierarchy of behavior, permitting the animal to build the missing components at
   lower levels through learning. A wolf cub which is trying to capture a fleeing
   animal unquestionably acts under the influence of instinct. But it is one thing
   to try and another to succeed. ''It may be considered,'' Miller, Galantier, and
   Pribram write, "that copulation is an instinctive form of behavior in rats. In
   certain respects this is in fact true. But the crudeness of copulative behavior
   by a rat which does not have experience in the area of courting shows plainly
   that some practice in these instinctive responses is essential.''

   As the organization of an animal becomes more complex and its ability to learn
   grows in the process of evolution, the instincts ''retreat upward,'' becoming
   increasingly abstract and leaving the animal more and more space for their
   realization. Thus the behavior of animals becomes increasingly flexible and
   changes operationally with changes in external conditions. The species' chances
   for survival grow .

MODELING

   IN OUR DISCUSSION of associations of representations thus far we have completely
   ignored their dynamic, temporal aspect; we have considered the representations
   being connected as static and without any coordinate in time. But the idea of
   time can enter actively into our representations. We can picture figures that are
   moving and changing at a certain speed and we can continue the observed process
   mentally. A wheel rolls down the road. We close our eyes for a second or two and
   picture the movement of the wheel. Upon opening our eyes we see it in exactly the
   place where we expected it. This is, of course, the result of an association of
   representations, but this means an association, or more correctly
   representations, which are organically bound up with the passage of time. The
   wheel's position x at moment t is associated with the position x[1] at moment t +
   [Delta]t with position x[2] at moment t + 2[Delta]t , and so on. Each of these
   representations includes a representation of the time to which it refers. We do
   not know the mechanism by which this inclusion is made and, in conformity with
   our approach, we shall not construct any hypotheses regarding this. We shall
   simply note that there is nothing particularly surprising in this. It is commonly
   known that an organism has its own time sensor, the ''internal clock.''

   The association of representations that have a time coordinate enables us to
   foresee future situations in our imagination. We have just established the
   existence of such representations relying on internal, subjective experience. But
   the fact that animals also reveal the capability for foresight (look at the way a
   dog catches a piece of sugar) leads us to conclude that animal representations
   may also have a time coordinate.

   Speaking in the language of cybernetics, the interconnection of representations
   which have a time coordinate and the resultant capability to foresee the future
   is simply modeling, constructing a model of the environment.

   [IMG.FIG3.9.GIF]

   Figure 3.9. Diagram of modeling.

   Let us give the general concept of the model. We shall consider two systems a and
   b. Let us assume that to each state Ai of system a we can somehow juxtapose one
   definite state B[i ]of system b. The inverse correspondence does not have to be
   unique (single-valued); that is, many states of a may correspond to one state of
   b. Because, according to our definition, the genenalized state is a set of
   states, this proposition may be described as a one-to-one correspondence of the
   states of system b to the generalized states of system  a  . This is necessary
   but not sufficient to consider system b a model of system  a . Additionally there
   must be a transformation T(t) of system b which depends on time t and models the
   natural passage of time in system  a . This means the following: Suppose that
   system  a  is initially in generalized state A[1] which corresponds to state B[1
   ]of system b. Suppose that after the passage of time t the state of system a
   becomes A[2] Then the conversion T(t) should switch system b to state B[2], which
   corresponds to generalized state A[2]. If this condition is met we call system b
   a model of system  a .

   The conversion T(t) may involve nothing more, specifically, than permitting
   system b by itself to change its state with time. Such models are called real
   time models.

   The besiegers dug an opening under the fortress wall and placed several barrels
   of powder in it. Next to them a candle was burning and from the base of the
   candle a trail of powder ran to the barrels. When the candle burned down the
   explosion would take place. An identical candle lighted at the same time was
   burning on a table in the tent of the leader of the besieging forces. This candle
   was his model of the first candle. Knowing how much time remained until the
   explosion he gave his last orders.... Wild faces leaned over the table, hairy
   hands clutched their weapons. The candle burned down and a fearsome explosion
   shook the air. The model had not let them down.

   The image on a television screen when a soccer game is being broadcast may also
   be formally considered a model of the soccer field and stands. All conditions are
   in fact observed. But one senses a great difference between the case of the two
   candles and the case of the soccer broadcast--a difference in the information
   links between systems a and b. Any image b of object  a  is a model of it in the
   broad sense; but there is a continuous flow of information from  a  to b and it
   is only thanks to this flow that the correspondence between states a and b is
   kept. With information access to b, we in fact have access to  a . System b
   operates as simply a phase in the transmission of information from  a .

   The situation is quite different in the case of the two candles. Candle b burns
   at the same speed as candle  a , but independently of it. The leader of the
   besieging forces does not have access to candle a and cannot receive any real
   information regarding its state. By modeling he compensates for this lack and
   obtains equivalent information. System b here plays a fundamentally different and
   more significant role. A spatial barrier is overcome, so to speak, by this means
   and this is done without establishing any new information channels.

   Even more important is the case where the model helps overcome a barrier of time
   rather than space. One cannot, alas, lay an information channel to the future.
   But a model permits us to operate as if there were such a channel. All that is
   required is that execution of the conversion T(t) on the model take less time
   than time t itself. Many other examples could be given of the use of such models
   in modern life, but that is hardly necessary. Let us return once again to
   associations of representations.

   We have seen that associations of static representations reflect the existence of
   spatial correlations, interrelationships in the environment. In exactly the same
   way associations of dynamic representations (models created by the brain) reflect
   dynamic temporal correlations that characterize the environment. Situation x
   after time t evokes (or may evoke) situation y--that is the general formula for
   such correlations, and in the brain these correlations are imprinted in the form
   of the corresponding associations.

COGNITION OF THE WORLD

   WHAT IS knowledge? From a cybernetic point of view, how can we describe the
   situation where a person or animal knows something or other? Suppose we know
   there are two people in an adjacent room. Since they really are there, if we go
   into the room we shall see two people there. Because we do know this, we can,
   without actually entering the room, imagine that we are opening the door and
   entering it; we shall picture the two people who are in the room. In our brains
   therefore, an association of representations takes place which enables us to
   foresee the results of certain actions: that is. there is a certain model of
   reality. For the same reason, when we see a rolling wheel, we know where it will
   be a second later, and for the same reason when a stick is shaken at a dog the
   animal knows that a blow will follow, and so on.

   Knowledge is the presence in the brain of a certain model of reality. An increase
   in knowledge--the emergence of new models of reality in the brain--is the process
   of cognition. Learning about the world is not a human privilege, but one
   characteristic of all higher animals. The fifth stage of evolution may be called
   the stage of individual cognition of the world.
     ____________________________________________________________________________

References

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   2. http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/turchin.html
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   8. http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/POS/Turchap3.html#Heading7
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  12. http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/POS/turchap2.html#IMG.FIG2.6.GIF