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European Parliament approved on 05 September, 2001 by 367 votes for, 159 against and 39
                                      abstentions

                            See the [10]final report here.

  Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy

  PE 302.015

  21. ECHELON

  A5-0264/2001

  Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System

  PE 305.391

  European Parliament resolution on the existence of a global system for the interception
  of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))

   The European Parliament
   ,

     - having regard to its decision of 5 July 2000 to set up a Temporary Committee
     on the ECHELON Interception System and the mandate issued to the Temporary
     Committee,

     - having regard to the EC Treaty, one objective of which is the establishment
     of a common market with a high level of competitiveness,

     - having regard to Articles 11 and 12 of the Treaty on European Union, which
     impose on the Member States a binding requirement to enhance and develop their
     mutual political solidarity,

     - having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 6(2)
     thereof, which lays down the requirement that the EU must respect fundamental
     rights, and Title V thereof, which sets out provisions governing the common
     foreign and security policy,

     - having regard to Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

     - having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Article 7 of
     which lays down the right to respect for private and family life and
     explicitly enshrines the right to respect for communications, and Article 8 of
     which protects personal data,

     - having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in
     particular Article 8 thereof, which governs the protection of private life and
     the confidentiality of correspondence, and the many other international
     conventions which provide for the protection of privacy,

     - having regard to the work carried out by the Temporary Committee on the
     ECHELON Interception System, which held a large number of hearings and
     meetings with experts of all kinds, and in particular with senior
     representatives of the public and private sectors in the sphere of
     telecommunications and data protection, with employees of intelligence and
     information services, with journalists, with lawyers with expert knowledge of
     this area, with members of the national parliaments of the Member States,
     etc.,

     - having regard to Rule 150(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

     - having regard to the report of the Temporary Committee on the ECHELON
     Interception System (A5-0264/2001),

   The existence of a global system for intercepting private and commercial
   communications (the ECHELON interception system)

     A. whereas the existence of a global system for intercepting communications,
     operating by means of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities among
     the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the UKUSA Agreement,
     is no longer in doubt; whereas it seems likely, in view of the evidence and
     the consistent pattern of statements from a very wide range of individuals and
     organisations, including American sources, that its name is in fact ECHELON,
     although this is a relatively minor detail,

     B. whereas there can now be no doubt that the purpose of the system is to
     intercept, at the very least, private and commercial communications, and not
     military communications, although the analysis carried out in the report has
     revealed that the technical capabilities of the system are probably not nearly
     as extensive as some sections of the media had assumed,

     C. whereas, therefore, it is surprising, not to say worrying, that many senior
     Community figures, including European Commissioners, who gave evidence to the
     Temporary Committee claimed to be unaware of this phenomenon,

   The limits of the interception system

     D. whereas the surveillance system depends, in particular, upon worldwide
     interception of satellite communications, although in areas characterised by a
     high volume of communications only a very small proportion of those
     communications are transmitted by satellite; whereas this means that the
     majority of communications cannot be intercepted by earth stations, but only
     by tapping cables and intercepting radio signals, something which - as the
     investigations carried out in connection with the report have shown - is
     possible only to a limited extent; whereas the numbers of personnel required
     for the final analysis of intercepted communications imposes further
     restrictions; whereas, therefore, the UKUSA states have access to only a very
     limited proportion of cable and radio communications and can analyse an even
     more limited proportion of those communications, and whereas, further, however
     extensive the resources and capabilities for the interception of
     communications may be, the extremely high volume of traffic makes exhaustive,
     detailed monitoring of all communications impossible in practice,

   The possible existence of other interception systems

     E. whereas the interception of communications is a method of spying commonly
     employed by intelligence services, so that other states might also operate
     similar systems, provided that they have the required funds and the right
     locations; whereas France is the only EU Member State which is - thanks to its
     overseas territories - geographically and technically capable of operating
     autonomously a global interception system and also possesses the technical and
     organisational infrastructure to do so; whereas there is also ample evidence
     that Russia is likely to operate such a system,

   Compatibility with EU law

     F. whereas, as regards the question of the compatibility of a system of the
     ECHELON type with EU law, it is necessary to distinguish between two
     scenarios: if a system is used purely for intelligence purposes, there is no
     violation of EU law, since operations in the interests of state security are
     not subject to the EC Treaty, but would fall under Title V of the Treaty on
     European Union (CFSP), although at present that title lays down no provisions
     on the subject, so that no criteria are available; if, on the other hand, the
     system is misused for the purposes of gathering competitive intelligence, such
     action is at odds with the Member States' duty of loyal cooperation and with
     the concept of a common market based on free competition, so that a Member
     State participating in such a system violates EC law,

     G. having regard to the statements made by the Council at the plenary sitting
     of 30 March 2000 to the effect that `the Council cannot accept the creation or
     existence of a telecommunications interception system which does not respect
     the laws of the Member States and which violates the fundamental principles
     aimed at protecting human dignity',

   Compatibility with the fundamental right to respect for private life (Article 8
   of the ECHR)

     H. whereas any interception of communications represents serious interference
     with an individual's exercise of the right to privacy; whereas Article 8 of
     the ECHR, which guarantees respect for private life, permits interference with
     the exercise of that right only in the interests of national security, in so
     far as this is in accordance with domestic law and the provisions in question
     are generally accessible and lay down under what circumstances, and subject to
     what conditions, the state may undertake such interference; whereas
     interference must be proportionate, so that competing interests need to be
     weighed up and, under the terms of the case law of the European Court of Human
     Rights, it is not enough that the interference should merely be useful or
     desirable,

     I. whereas an intelligence system which intercepted communications permanently
     and at random would be in violation of the principle of proportionality and
     would not be compatible with the ECHR; whereas it would also constitute a
     violation of the ECHR if the rules governing the surveillance of
     communications lacked a legal basis, if the rules were not generally
     accessible or if they were so formulated that their implications for the
     individual were unforeseeable, or if the interference was not proportionate;
     whereas most of the rules governing the activities of US intelligence services
     abroad are classified, so that compliance with the principle of
     proportionality is at least doubtful and breaches of the principles of
     accessibility and foreseeability laid down by the European Court of Human
     Rights probably occur,

     J. whereas the Member States cannot circumvent the requirements imposed on
     them by the ECHR by allowing other countries' intelligence services, which are
     subject to less stringent legal provisions, to work on their territory, since
     otherwise the principle of legality, with its twin components of accessibility
     and foreseeability, would become a dead letter and the case law of the
     European Court of Human Rights would be deprived of its substance,

     K. whereas, in addition, the lawful operations of intelligence services are
     consistent with fundamental rights only if adequate arrangements exist for
     monitoring them, in order to counterbalance the risks inherent in secret
     activities performed by a part of the administrative apparatus; whereas the
     European Court of Human Rights has expressly stressed the importance of an
     efficient system for monitoring intelligence operations, so that there are
     grounds for concern in the fact that some Member States do not have
     parliamentary monitoring bodies of their own responsible for scrutinising the
     secret services,

   Are EU citizens adequately protected against intelligence services?

     L. whereas the protection enjoyed by EU citizens depends on the legal
     situation in the individual Member States, which varies very substantially,
     and whereas in some cases parliamentary monitoring bodies do not even exist,
     so that the degree of protection can hardly be said to be adequate; whereas it
     is in the fundamental interests of European citizens that their national
     parliaments should have a specific, formally structured monitoring committee
     responsible for supervising and scrutinising the activities of the
     intelligence services; whereas even where monitoring bodies do exist, there is
     a strong temptation for them to concentrate more on the activities of domestic
     intelligence services, rather than those of foreign intelligence services,
     since as a rule it is only the former which affect their own citizens; whereas
     it would be an encouragement for proportionate interference practices, if
     intelligence services were obliged to notify a citizen whose communications
     have been intercepted of this fact afterwards, for example five years after
     the interception took place,

     M. whereas, in view of their size, satellite receiving stations cannot be
     built on the territory of a state without its consent,

     N. whereas, in the event of cooperation between intelligence services under
     the CFSP or in the areas of justice and home affairs, the institutions must
     introduce adequate measures to protect European citizens,

   Industrial espionage

     O. whereas part of the remit of foreign intelligence services is to gather
     economic data, such as details of developments in individual sectors of the
     economy, trends on commodity markets, compliance with economic embargoes,
     observance of rules on supplying dual-use goods, etc., and whereas, for these
     reasons, the firms concerned are often subject to surveillance,

     P. whereas the US intelligence services do not merely investigate general
     economic facts but also intercept detailed communications between firms,
     particularly where contracts are being awarded, and they justify this on the
     grounds of combating attempted bribery; whereas detailed interception poses
     the risk that information may be used for the purpose of competitive
     intelligence-gathering rather than combating corruption, even though the US
     and the United Kingdom state that they do not do so; whereas, however, the
     role of the Advocacy Center of the US Department of Commerce is still not
     totally clear and talks arranged with the Center with a view to clarifying the
     matter were cancelled,

     Q. whereas an agreement on combating the bribery of officials, under which
     bribery is criminalised at international level, was adopted by the OECD in
     1997, and this provides a further reason why individual cases of bribery
     cannot justify the interception of communications,

     R. whereas the situation becomes intolerable when intelligence services allow
     themselves to be used for the purposes of gathering competitive intelligence
     by spying on foreign firms with the aim of securing a competitive advantage
     for firms in the home country, and whereas it is frequently maintained that
     the global interception system has been used in this way, although no such
     case has been substantiated,

     S. whereas, during the visit by the delegation from the Temporary Committee to
     the US, authoritative sources confirmed the US Congress Brown Report,
     indicating that 5% of intelligence gathered via non-open sources is used as
     economic intelligence; whereas it was estimated by the same sources that this
     intelligence surveillance could enable US industry to earn up to USD 7 billion
     in contracts,

     T. whereas sensitive commercial data are mostly kept inside individual firms,
     so that competitive intelligence-gathering in particular involves efforts to
     obtain information through members of staff or through people planted in the
     firm for this purpose or else, more and more commonly, by hacking into
     internal computer networks; whereas only if sensitive data are transmitted
     externally by cable or radio (satellite) can a communications surveillance
     system be used for competitive intelligence-gathering; whereas this applies
     systematically in the following three cases:

     - in the case of firms which operate in three time zones, so that interim
     results are sent from Europe to America and on to Asia;

     - in the case of videoconferencing within multinationals using VSAT or cable;

     - if vital contracts are being negotiated on the spot (e.g. for the building
     of plants, telecommunications infrastructure, the creation of new transport
     systems, etc.) and it is necessary to consult the firm's head office,

     U. whereas risk and security awareness in small and medium-sized firms is
     often inadequate and the dangers of economic espionage and the interception of
     communications are not recognised,

     V. whereas security awareness is not always well developed in the European
     institutions (with the exception of the European Central Bank, the Council
     Directorate-General for External Relations and the Commission
     Directorate-General for External Relations) and action is therefore necessary,

   Possible self-protection measures

     W. whereas firms can only make themselves secure by safeguarding their entire
     working environment and protecting all communications channels which are used
     to send sensitive information; whereas sufficiently secure encryption systems
     exist at affordable prices on the European market; whereas private individuals
     should also be urged to encrypt e-mails; whereas an unencrypted e-mail message
     is like a letter without an envelope; whereas relatively user-friendly systems
     exist on the Internet which are even made available for private use free of
     charge,

   Cooperation among intelligence services within the EU

     X. whereas the EU has reached agreement on the coordination of
     intelligence-gathering by intelligence services as part of the development of
     its own security and defence policy, although cooperation with other partners
     in these areas will continue,

     Y. whereas in December 1999 in Helsinki the European Council decided to
     develop more effective European military capabilities with a view to
     undertaking the full range of Petersberg tasks in support of the CFSP; whereas
     the European Council decided furthermore that, in order to achieve this goal,
     by the year 2003 the Union should be able to deploy rapidly units of about 50
     000 - 60 000 troops which should be self-sustaining, including the necessary
     command, control and intelligence capabilities; whereas the first steps
     towards such an autonomous intelligence capability have already been taken in
     the framework of the WEU and the standing Political and Security Committee,

     Z. whereas cooperation among intelligence services within the EU seems
     essential on the grounds that, firstly, a common security policy which did not
     involve the secret services would not make sense, and, secondly, it would have
     numerous professional, financial and political advantages; whereas it would
     also accord better with the idea of the EU as a partner on an equal footing
     with the United States and could bring together all the Member States in a
     system which complied fully with the ECHR; whereas the European Parliament
     would of course have to exercise appropriate monitoring,

     AA. whereas the European Parliament is in the process of implementing European
     Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 on public access to
     European Parliament, Council and Commission documents by amending the
     provisions of its Rules of Procedure as regards access to sensitive documents,

   Conclusion and amendment of international agreements on the protection of
   citizens and firms

     1. States, on the basis of the information obtained by the Temporary
     Committee, that the existence of a global system for intercepting
     communications, operating with the participation of the United States, the
     United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the UKUSA Agreement,
     is no longer in doubt;

     2. Calls on the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe to submit to the
     Ministerial Committee a proposal to protect private life, as guaranteed in
     Article 8 of the ECHR, brought into line with modern communication and
     interception methods by means of an additional protocol or, together with the
     provisions governing data protection, as part of a revision of the Convention
     on Data Protection, with the proviso that this should neither undermine the
     level of legal protection established by the European Court of Human Rights
     nor reduce the flexibility which is vital if future developments are to be
     taken into account;

     3. Calls on the Member States - whose laws governing the interception
     capabilities of the secret services contain provisions on the protection of
     privacy which are discriminatory - to provide all European citizens with the
     same legal guarantees concerning the protection of privacy and the
     confidentiality of correspondence;

     4. Calls on the Member States of the European Union to establish a European
     platform consisting of representatives of the national bodies that are
     responsible for monitoring Member States' performance in complying with
     fundamental and citizens' rights in order to scrutinise the consistency of
     national laws on the intelligence services with the ECHR and the EU Charter of
     Fundamental Rights, to review the legal provisions guaranteeing postal and
     communications secrecy, and, in addition, to reach agreement on a
     recommendation to the Member States on a Code of Conduct to be drawn up which
     guarantees all European citizens, throughout the territory of the Member
     States, protection of privacy as defined in Article 7 of the Charter of
     Fundamental Rights of the European Union and which, moreover, guarantees that
     the activities of intelligence services are carried out in a manner consistent
     with fundamental rights, in keeping with the conditions set out in Chapter 8
     of the report of the European Parliament's temporary committee, and in
     particular Section 8.3.4.; emphasises the need to draw up joint standards
     which are better suited to the requirements of protecting the fundamental
     rights of EU citizens and more stringent than those guaranteed by Article 8 of
     the ECHR;

     5. Calls on the Member States to adopt the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as
     a legally binding and enforceable act at the next Intergovernmental Conference
     in order to raise the standard of protection for fundamental rights,
     particularly with regard to the protection of privacy;

     6. Calls on the member countries of the Council of Europe to adopt an
     additional protocol which enables the European Communities to accede to the
     ECHR or to consider other measures designed to prevent disputes relating to
     case law arising between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of
     Justice of the European Communities;

     7. Urges the EU institutions in the meantime to apply the fundamental rights
     enshrined in the ECHR and its protocols and in the Charter within the scope of
     their respective powers and activities;

     8. Calls on the UN Secretary-General to instruct the competent committee to
     put forward proposals designed to bring Article 17 of the International
     Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the protection of
     privacy, into line with technical innovations;

     9. Regards it as essential that an agreement should be negotiated and signed
     between the European Union and the United States stipulating that each of the
     two parties should observe, vis-à-vis the other, the provisions governing the
     protection of the privacy of citizens and the confidentiality of business
     communications applicable to its own citizens and firms;

     10. Calls on the US to sign the Additional Protocol to the International
     Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, so that complaints by individuals
     concerning breaches of the Covenant by the US can be submitted to the Human
     Rights Committee set up under the Covenant; calls on the relevant American
     NGOs, in particular the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) and the EPIC
     (Electronic Privacy Information Center), to exert pressure on the US
     Administration to that end;

   National legislative measures to protect citizens and firms

     11. Urges the Member States to review and if necessary to adapt their own
     legislation on the operations of the intelligence services to ensure that it
     is consistent with fundamental rights as laid down in the ECHR and with the
     case law of the European Court of Human Rights;

     12. Calls on the Member States to endow themselves with binding instruments
     which afford natural and legal persons effective protection against all forms
     of illegal interception of their communications;

     13. Calls on the Member States to aspire to a common level of protection
     against intelligence operations and, to that end, to draw up a Code of Conduct
     (as referred to in paragraph 4) based on the highest level of protection which
     exists in any Member State, since as a rule it is citizens of other states,
     and hence also of other Member States, that are affected by the operations of
     foreign intelligence services;

     14. Calls on the Member States to negotiate with the US a Code of Conduct
     similar to that of the EU;

     15. Calls on those Member States which have not yet done so to guarantee
     appropriate parliamentary and legal supervision of their secret services;

     16. Urges the Council and the Member States to establish as a matter of
     priority a system for the democratic monitoring and control of the autonomous
     European intelligence capability and other joint and coordinated intelligence
     activities at European level; proposes that the European Parliament should
     play an important role in this monitoring and control system;

     17. Calls on the Member States to pool their communications interception
     resources with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the ESDP in the areas
     of intelligence-gathering and the fight against terrorism, nuclear
     proliferation or international drug trafficking, in accordance with the
     provisions governing the protection of citizens' privacy and the
     confidentiality of business communications, and subject to monitoring by the
     European Parliament, the Council and the Commission;

     18. Calls on the Member States to conclude an agreement with third countries
     aimed at providing increased protection of privacy for EU citizens, under
     which all contracting states give a commitment, where one contracting state
     intercepts communications in another contracting state, to inform the latter
     of the planned actions;

   Specific legal measures to combat industrial espionage

     19. Calls on the Member States to consider to what extent industrial espionage
     and the payment of bribes as a way of securing contracts can be combated by
     means of European and international legal provisions and, in particular,
     whether WTO rules could be adopted which take account of the distortions of
     competition brought about by such practices, for example by rendering
     contracts obtained in this way null and void; calls on the United States,
     Australia, New Zealand and Canada to join this initiative;

     20. Calls on the Member States to undertake to incorporate in the EC Treaty a
     clause prohibiting industrial espionage and not to engage in industrial
     espionage against one another, either directly or with the assistance of a
     foreign power which might carry out operations on their territory, nor to
     allow a foreign power to conduct espionage operations from the soil of an EU
     Member State, thereby complying with the letter and spirit of the EC Treaty;

     21. Calls on the Member States to undertake by means of a clear and binding
     instrument not to engage in industrial espionage, thereby signifying their
     compliance with the letter and spirit of the EC Treaty; calls on the Member
     States to transpose this binding principle into their national legislation on
     intelligence services;

     22. Calls on the Member States and the US Administration to start an open
     US-EU dialogue on economic intelligence-gathering;

   Measures concerning the implementation of the law and the monitoring of that
   implementation

     23. Calls on the national parliaments which have no parliamentary monitoring
     body responsible for scrutinising the activities of the intelligence services
     to set up such a body;

     24. Calls on the monitoring bodies responsible for scrutinising the activities
     of the secret services, when exercising their monitoring powers, to attach
     great importance to the protection of privacy, regardless of whether the
     individuals concerned are their own nationals, other EU nationals or
     third-country nationals;

     25. Calls on the Member States to make sure that their intelligence systems
     are not misused for the purposes of gathering competitive intelligence, an act
     at odds with the Member States' duty of loyal cooperation and with the concept
     of a common market based on free competition;

     26. Calls on Germany and the United Kingdom to make the authorisation of
     further communications interception operations by US intelligence services on
     their territory conditional on their compliance with the ECHR, i.e. to
     stipulate that they should be consistent with the principle of
     proportionality, that their legal basis should be accessible and that the
     implications for individuals should be foreseeable, and to introduce
     corresponding, effective monitoring measures, since they are responsible for
     ensuring that intelligence operations authorised or even merely tolerated on
     their territory respect human rights;

   Measures to encourage self-protection by citizens and firms

     27. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to inform their citizens and
     firms about the possibility that their international communications may, under
     certain circumstances, be intercepted; insists that this information should be
     accompanied by practical assistance in designing and implementing
     comprehensive protection measures, including the security of information
     technology;

     28. Calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to develop and
     implement an effective and active policy for security in the information
     society; insists that as part of this policy specific attention should be
     given to increasing the awareness of all users of modern communication systems
     of the need to protect confidential information; furthermore, insists on the
     establishment of a Europe-wide, coordinated network of agencies capable of
     providing practical assistance in designing and implementing comprehensive
     protection strategies;

     29. Urges the Commission and Member States to devise appropriate measures to
     promote, develop and manufacture European encryption technology and software
     and above all to support projects aimed at developing user-friendly
     open-source encryption software;

     30. Calls on the Commission and Member States to promote software projects
     whose source text is made public (open-source software), as this is the only
     way of guaranteeing that no backdoors are built into programmes;

     31. Calls on the Commission to lay down a standard for the level of security
     of e-mail software packages, placing those packages whose source code has not
     been made public in the `least reliable' category;

     32. Calls on the European institutions and the public administrations of the
     Member States systematically to encrypt e-mails, so that ultimately encryption
     becomes the norm;

     33. Calls on the Community institutions and the public administrations of the
     Member States to provide training for their staff and make their staff
     familiar with new encryption technologies and techniques by means of the
     necessary practical training and courses;

     34. Calls for particular attention to be paid to the position of the applicant
     countries; urges that they should be given support, if their lack of
     technological independence prevents them from implementing the requisite
     protective measures;

   Other measures

     35. Calls on firms to cooperate more closely with counter-espionage services,
     and particularly to inform them of attacks from outside for the purposes of
     industrial espionage, in order to improve the services' efficiency;

     36. Calls on the Commission to have a security analysis carried out which will
     show what needs to be protected, and to have a protection strategy drawn up;

     37. Calls on the Commission to update its encryption system in line with the
     latest developments, given that modernisation is urgently needed, and calls on
     the budgetary authorities (the Council together with Parliament) to provide
     the necessary funding;

     38. Proposes that its competent committee draw up an own-initiative report on
     security and the protection of secrecy in the European institutions;

     39. Calls on the Commission to ensure that data is protected in its own
     data-processing systems and to step up the protection of secrecy in relation
     to documents not accessible to the public;

     40. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to invest in new
     technologies in the field of decryption and encryption techniques as part of
     the Sixth Research Framework Programme;

     41. Urges states which have been placed at a disadvantage by distortions of
     competition resulting from state aid or the economic misuse of espionage to
     inform the authorities and monitoring bodies of the state from which the
     activities were undertaken in order to put a stop to the distorting
     activities;

     42. Calls on the Commission to put forward a proposal to establish, in close
     cooperation with industry and the Member States, a Europe-wide, coordinated
     network of advisory centres - in particular in those Member States where such
     centres do not yet exist - to deal with issues relating to the security of the
     information held by firms, with the twin task of increasing awareness of the
     problem and providing practical assistance;

     43. Takes the view that an international congress on the protection of privacy
     against telecommunications surveillance should be held in order to provide
     NGOs from Europe, the US and other countries with a forum for discussion of
     the cross-border and international aspects of the problem and coordination of
     areas of activity and action;

                                           o

                                          o o

     44. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the
     Commission, the Secretary-General and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
     Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and applicant
     countries, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
     ____________________________________________________________________________

  SPEECH/01/368

  Mr Erkki Liikanen Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enterprise and the
  Information Society European Parliament motion for a resolution on the Echelon
  interception system EP motion for a resolution on the Echelon interception system
  Strasbourg, 5 September 2001

   President and Honourable Members,

   I would like to congratulate Mr. Coelho, chairman, and the honourable members of
   the Parliament who participated in the work of the Temporary Committee on
   Echelon, and especially the rapporteur Mr. Schmid, with the comprehensive and
   well written report on the Echelon interception system.

   Context

   The Commission has been following the parliamentary work over the past year with
   great interest. The issue touches upon complex technological and political
   considerations. The report presents a large number of references to the existence
   of a global interception system. These build up a body of evidence.

   The Commission already stated on 30 March last year: "It is the very nature of
   intelligence activities that those who are not involved in these activities are
   not able to confirm, nor deny their existence". Even though the Commission is not
   involved in 'intelligence gathering' activities, we do not put in question the
   findings of the European Parliament.

   The present report of the ECHELON temporary committee is based on careful and
   thorough work.

   The European Union is founded on the respect for human rights and fundamental
   freedoms (art 6 of TEU and EU Charter of fundamental rights). As the guardian of
   the Treaty, the European Commission attaches the utmost importance to the respect
   of these principles.

   The abuse of large-scale communications intelligence is something that can make
   an individual living in a democratic society feel uneasy. Privacy is a
   fundamental right. Any derogation from this right has to be specifically provided
   for by law, necessary for objectives of general interest, proportionate, and
   subject to adequate checks and guarantees against any form of misuse.

   The Commission is determined to look at the practical implications of the EU
   Charter of fundamental rights, where, in particular, the protection of
   communications and personal data will be further enhanced. The Commission has
   already stated that it considers it would be preferable for the Charter to be
   integrated into the Treaties for the sake of visibility and legal certainty.

   At the same time, the Community has to act within the scope of the competencies
   conferred upon it by the Treaty.

   Compatibility with EU law

   The findings of the Committee concerning the compatibility of a system of the
   'Echelon type' with EU law distinguish between two scenarios:
     * whether such a system is used purely for intelligence purposes,
     * or the system is abused for the purpose of gathering competitive
       intelligence.

   The Commission shares the opinion that operations envisaged in the first scenario
   in the interest of State security fall under the scope of Title V of the Treaty
   on European Union which sets out the framework for the establishment of a Common
   Foreign and Security Policy.

   This lays down no provisions on intelligence activities. Member States remain
   responsible for the conduct and supervision of intelligence operations unless the
   Council decides otherwise. The EU treaty does not empower the Commission to
   exercise its prerogatives as guardian of the Treaty in this field.

   Maintaining an interception system for the purpose of gathering intelligence in
   the context of a Member State's defence or national security is outside the scope
   of the directives in force on data protection.

   As to the second scenario, gathering of competitive intelligence does not come
   within the scope of a common foreign and security policy. It is not an activity
   that would be allowed under the guise of the pursuit of a Common Foreign and
   Security Policy.

   In so far as Community law is concerned, such activity could fall within the
   scope of the data protection directives. This is the case if data gathered by
   Echelon type systems is collected or subsequently passed on to commercial
   undertakings for purposes unrelated to the prevention of criminal offences and
   unrelated to State security matters.

   Technological developments in electronic communications

   We are all aware that electronic communications play and increasingly important
   role in everyday life. Well functioning electronic communications infrastructures
   are crucial for our economies.

   Europe wants to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy
   in the world. A pre-condition to achieve this is the need to build trust in
   electronic communications. This concerns both our citizens and our businesses.

   The development in technologies can bring protection against surveillance. It is
   a comforting finding that the use of fibre optic cables instead of satellites for
   trans-continental communications has decreased the possibilities for large-scale
   routine interception.

   The argument that the rise of the commercial Internet has diminished
   significantly the possibilities for interception is convincing. Today, the
   majority of Internet communications by cable no longer leave the European
   continent.

   Commission policy to improve information security

   The Commission has taken important steps over the past years in order to develop
   a policy to improve the security of electronic communications.

   The availability and free circulation of encryption products and technologies in
   the European Union has now been ensured with the dual use regulation in place
   since September 2000. The support through the Community's Research Framework
   Programme, in particular the Information Society Technologies program, has
   improved the conditions to develop top of the range European encryption products
   in order to enable EU citizens, companies and governments to protect their
   communications.

   However, this is not sufficient to guarantee a wide spread use of encryption.
   Especially citizens and small businesses are not always aware of the potential
   threats. We need to inform them about the possibilities of encryption.

   In June this year, the Commission adopted a Communication on Network and
   Information Security. The purpose is to tackle this awareness problem and to
   further develop a European approach on security related issues. I am very glad to
   notice that the conclusions of the report we are discussing here today are very
   much in line with the approach adopted by the Commission.

   The Honourable Members know that there is already a legal framework in place at
   EU level addressing data protection and obligations for operators. There is also
   an emerging policy on cybercrime. Network and Information security is now coming
   in as a third element, to complete the picture.

   Although the Communication is not meant to contain a fully-fledged 'action plan'
   we have already identified some broad action lines where progress needs to be
   made.

   I will highlight some of them:
     * to raise awareness public information and education campaigns should be
       launched and best practices should be promoted;
     * a European warning and information system is needed to strengthen the
       activities of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) or similar entities
       and improve the co-ordination amongst them; I have noted the Parliament's
       support for this idea;
     * examine how to best organise at European level pro-active and co-ordinated
       measures to develop forward looking responses to existing and emerging
       security threats (e. g. an Information Security Observatory);
     * concerning the legal framework we will set up an inventory of national
       measures, which have been taken in accordance with relevant Community law.

   I would also like to mention that further action is needed to support the
   development of technology, streamlined standardisation and certification work,
   the introduction of security in government use and better international
   co-operation.

   As a next step it is our intention to develop a roadmap before the end of this
   year containing concrete actions with firm deadlines in order to start putting a
   European Information Security policy in place.

   Commission's own information systems

   The Commission is constantly improving the protection of its own information
   systems in terms of availability, integrity and confidentiality, especially in
   view of the changing nature of the various existing and potential threats.

   The entry point to the Commission network is constantly monitored and actively
   tested. Similar efforts are conducted through projects for secure video
   conferencing, secure telephone systems and encryption of databases. Furthermore
   security audits of Commission information systems are conducted on a regular
   basis.

   A new Information Systems Security Policy has been drafted and is currently being
   prepared for discussion within Commission services. In addition the Commission is
   reviewing its overall security policy as a result of internal reorganisation
   activities and policy developments (e.g. Common Foreign and Security Policy,
   Justice and Home Affairs).

   The new internal Commission security provisions, will follow the model of the
   Council Security regulation adopted earlier this year, and will be based on the
   following principles:
     * proportionality of security measures in relation to existing risks,
     * shared responsibility and accountability of staff, management and security
       experts,
     * integration of all elements into a coherent security strategy (e.g.
       personnel, information and physical security)
     * close co-operation between European and national security organisations.

   The Commission intends to allocate additional resources to the security domain.
   However, scarce technical and human resources, especially in the field of
   information security specialists, do hamper the full deployment of security
   policies. This concern is common to most public administrations, including the
   European Institutions. I welcome the support in the report to allocate more
   resources for the tasks to be undertaken in this field.

   I sincerely hope that the budgetary authorities will follow this position.

   Conclusion

   President, the trust of European citizens and businesses in electronic
   communications and the well functioning of information infrastructures has become
   crucial for our economies.

   Let me reiterate once more in this perspective that the Commission attaches the
   utmost importance to the respect of Human Rights and the respect of Rules of Law.

   Thank you.
     ____________________________________________________________________________

References

   1. http://www.cyber-rights.org/
   2. http://www.cyber-rights.org/background.htm
   3. http://www.cyber-rights.org/contact.htm
   4. http://www.cyber-rights.org/reports/
   5. http://www.cyber-rights.org/policy/
   6. http://www.cyber-rights.org/news/
   7. http://www.cyber-rights.org/press/
   8. http://www.cyber-rights.org/mailing.htm
   9. http://www.cyber-rights.org/bookstore
  10. http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/OM-Europarl?PROG=REPORT&L=EN&PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2001-0264+0+NOT+SGML+V0//EN